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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is

an

appeal

from

a

trial

de

novo

after

an

administrative revocation of appellant's driver license by the
Department of Public Safety, Driver License Services, pursuant
to Title

41, Chapter

6, Section

44.10, Utah Code Annotated,

1953 as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A trial de novo was held in the Third Judicial District
Court before the Honorable Dean Conder, Judge presiding.

The

court denied appellant's motion to reinstate her driver license
on October 23, 1985.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order from this court to have her
driver license reinstated by respondent.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Was appellant clearly warned of the consequences of a

refusal to take a

chemical

Driving Under

Influence

the

volitional actions clearly

test after

she

of Alcohol

was arrested

and

did

for

appellant's

indicate an intention to refuse to

submit to such a test?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July
Lake City

Police

27, 1985, at approximately
Officer

Scott

Gardner

2:15 a.m.,

observed

Salt

appellant

driving south bound on West Temple Street in Salt Lake City.
(Tr. 3)

At 600 South appellant made a right-hand turn, result-

ing in her driving the wrong way on a one-way street.

(Tr. 4)

She then turned left at the next intersection and pulled into a
hotel parking lot.

(Tr. 4) The officer had been following her

with his overhead lights on as she drove on 600 South.
approached her in the hotel parking lot.

He then

(Tr. 4-6)

At that time the officer detected an odor of alcohol,
noticed that her eyes

were

somewhat bloodshot, and

that she was unsteady on her feet.

(Tr. 6)

observed

He reguested that

she perform several field sobriety tests, and also informed her
that she

need

(Tr. 13)

not

take

those tests

if she did

not want to.

At that time, the passenger in her car began to talk

to appellant, thus interfering with the officer, and distracting
appellant.

(Tr.

12)

field sobriety tests.

Appellant

then

refused

to perform the

(Tr. 7, 13)

Appellant was placed under arrest for driving
the influence

of

alcohol.

(Tr. 14)

appellant and she began to cry.

The

(Tr. 14)

officer

under

handcuffed

He then drove her to

the Salt Lake County Jail.

In the parking lot at the jail, the

officer read the three admonitions off the "DUI Report Form"!
as appellant continued to cry.
and tried
(Tr. 8-10)

to

explain

the

He waited another ten minutes

implied

consent

law to

appellant.

Appellant at one time stated "you are going to ruin

my job", then continued to cry without verbally responding to
his requests.

(Tr. 8-10)

After hearing these facts, the trial court ruled that
crying, in and of itself, is not an indication that a person does
not hear or understand what is said and that a witness heard
that which was audibly announced.
reinstatement was denied.

(Tr. 21)

The request for

(Tr. 21)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's reactions to the officer's requests for a
chemical test of her blood alcohol level did not indicate that
she understood the consequences of a failure to submit to such
a test.

Likewise, her

conduct

did

not

clearly

indicate

a

volitional refusal to submit to such a test.
ARGUMENT
APPELLANT WAS NOT CLEARLY INFORMED OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO A
CHEMICAL TEST OF HER BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT,
NOR DID HER ACTIONS CLEARLY INDICATE AN
INTENTION TO REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO SUCH A
TEST.
Before one's

driver

license

may

be

revoked

for a

1. The admonitions as described in the standard DUI Report
Form are attached in the Addendum, and the officer's reading is
reproduced on pages 6-7, infra.

refusal to submit to a chemical test,certain statutory prerequisites must be met by the arresting officer.

Those are described

in Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-44.10(2) (1953 as amended) which
provides in part:
If the person has been placed under arrest
and has thereafter been requested by a
peace officer to submit to any one or more
of the chemical tests provided for in
subsection (1) of this section and refuses
to submit to the chemical test or tests,
the person shall be warned by a peace
officer requesting the test or tests that a
refusal to submit to the test or tests can
result in revocation of his license to
operate a motor vehicle.
Following this
warning, unless the person immediately
requests the chemical test or tests as
offered by a peace officer be administered,
no test shall be given and a peace officer
shall submit a sworn report.
This court

has

interpreted

this statute

to contain

several mandatory aspects:
The important and mandatory aspects of this
subsection are: after his arrest, the
person should be informed which chemical
test the officer has designated, and the
consequences of his refusal to submit to
the requested test.
To comply with the
mandate of the statute, the refusal and the
advice, as to the resulting consequences,
must be within the same time frame, but not
necessarily within a precise sequence
they are integral to each other, and must
be so administered.
Elliot v. Dorius, 557
P.2d 759, 762 (Ut. 1976)
This court has also described

the officer's

with respect to the nature of the warnings:
The officer is responsible for making this
clear to the arrested motorist, and this
duty must be discharged in a fashion that
will clearly alert the driver to the
consequences of a refusal whether expressed

duties

verbally or implied from his conduct and
words. Holman v. Coxf 598 P.2d 1331f 1334
(Ut. 1979)
This court has also described

the officer's

duties

with respect to the nature of the warnings:
The officer is responsible for making this
clear to the arrested motorist, and this
duty must be discharged in a fashion that
will clearly alert the driver to the
conseguences of a refusal whether expressed
verbally or implied from his conduct and
words. Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1334
(Ut. 1979)
In Holmanf

this court went on

to hold that

if the

rights and obligations of the driver under the implied consent
statute are not made clear to him, then it would be improper to
revoke his driver license.
Holman also addressed the issue of what constitutes a
refusal to take a test:
Obviously the arresting officer cannot know
the subjective state of mind of the person
arrested and whether he in fact intended
his response to a reguest to take a blood
test to be the eguivalent of a refusal that
would result in license revocation.
The
test must be objective; otherwise the whole
statutory scheme could be subverted by one
who eguivocates or remains silent, and
later protests that it was his unexpressed
intent to take the test.
However, the
behavior of the driver must clearly indicate, judged objectively, that the driver
intended to refuse to take the test.
[Citations ommitted]
When an officer is confronted by a hostile
driver, it is important that the personal
animosities that may arise not be used as
the basis for a conclusion by the officer
that the driver refused.
Rather, the actual behavior of the driver, as would be
judged by a disinterested bystander, should

be the basis for such a conclusion*
phasis added] 598 P.2d at 1331.

[Em-

The officer's testimony on direct examination regarding the requests for a chemical test and appellant's responses
was as follows:
Q. [By Mr. Hale] After reading what is
known as the .08 admonition did you request
that she take a chemical test?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And what test did you request?

A.

Breath test.

Q. And what was her response to your request?
A. While I was reading these she was
continually crying; and when I asked her
what is your response on [sic] my request you
submit to a chemical test, she continued to
cry? but she says, "You're going to ruin my
job."
0. Ok. So she was cryinq and upset. Did
she give any indications that she did not
understand what your request was?
A.

No.

Q.

Say anything or do anythinq?

A.

No.

That's all she said at that time.

Q. The second admonition, would you read
that as you read it to her that evening?
A. If you refuse, a test will not be given;
however, I must warn you, that if you do
refuse your license or permit to drive a
motor vehicle can be revoked for one year
with no provision for a limited driver's
license.
After you've taken this test, you'll be
permitted to have a physician of your own
choice, administer a test at your own

expense, in addition to the one that I
requested you to submit to, so long as it
does not delay the test or tests requested
by me. Upon your request, I'll make
available to you, the results of the test
if you take it.
Q. Did you again request her to take the
test?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And what was the response?

A.

She continued crying.

Q. There is another admonition there; did
you read that to her?
A.

Yes, I did.

0. Would
please?

you

read

it

as

you

did

then,

A. Your right to remain silent and your
right to counsel do not apply to the implied
consent law, which is civil in nature and
separate from the criminal charges.
Your
right to remain silent does not give you
the right to refuse to take the test. You
do not have the right to have counsel during
the test procedure. Unless you submit to
the test I am requesting, I'll consider
that you have refused to take the test. I
warn you, that if you refuse to take the
test, your driving license can be revoked
for one year with no provision for a limited
license.
Q. Did you again make the
breath test?

request

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And what was the response?

A. There
crying.

was no response;

she

for a

continued

Q. Now, you've written in some language
there below that admonition.
Would you
explain that?

A. Oh, yeah. She did state that. She
said, "Please help me", and then she
continued to cry. (Tr. 8-10)
The officer

indicated

that

he waited

another

ten

minutes, during that time the appellant continued to cry, he
then tried to explain the implied consent law to her, but again
she continued

to cry.

officer indicated

(Tr. 10)

On

cross examination

the

that appellant gave no acknowledgment that

she had heard what was read to her (Tr. 18-19) nor was the
officer observing her reactions to these admonitions other than
to hear her continuous crying.

(Tr. 19)

This court has previously dealt with
refusals" in a number of cases.

"constructive

In Mathie v. Schwendiman, 656

P.2d 463 (Ut. 1982) , after being stopped for weaving and speeding,
the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol.

He agreed to take a chemical test but refused to

remove the chewing gum from his mouth.

This court held that

even though the driver agreed to take a test, the volitional
failure to do what is necessary to perform a chemical test
constituted a refusal.
In Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335 (Ut.

1979), the defen-

dant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.
After being

informed

driver responded
criminal".

of the

"I'm

When asked

a

consequences

of a

refusal the

criminal, yeah, yeah, yeah, I'm a

if he would take a test, the driver

responded "I don't know".

A fourth, and final request was made

and the driver refused to respond.

This court held that there

need not be an express refusal to take the chemical test, but
that a volitional failure to perform an act necessary to the
proper completion of the test constitutes a refusal.

In both

of these cases it is important to note that both drivers acknowledged, through either words or conduct, that a chemical test
had been requested.
By way of contrast, in Hyde v. Dorius, 549 P.2d 451
(Ut. 1976), the defendant was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol and requested to take a chemical test.
When informed of the consequences of a refusal to take the test
she stated that the police did not know what they were talking
about.

She then began to cry and scream and became very belli-

gerent.

She subsequently took two field sobriety tests but was

never again offered the opportunity to take a chemical test.
The court ordered the defendant's license reinstated, in doing
so, two of the justices held that an express refusal was necessary to invoke the statutory sanctions of license revocation.
One justice held that the facts did not justify such a revocation.

The requirement for an express refusal was rejected in

Beck v. Cox, supra.

However, appellant submits that Hyde v.

Dorius, supra, may still be read to stand for the proposition
that the facts there were insufficient to establish a volitional
refusal.
In the instant case, the evidence indicates that appellant was extremely upset and crying as the required admonitions were read to her.

The trial court ruled that, by being

present when something is said, a witness hears and understands
it.

(Tr. 21) The effect of the trial court's ruling is that an

officer need merely read the admonitions no matter what the
mental condition

of the driver is.

The case law from this

court is contrary to this holding.

As described above, the

driver must be clearly alerted to the consequences of a refusal,
and furthermore, the driver's actions must clearly indicate an
intent to refuse
supra.
met.

to take the chemical test.

Holman v. Cox,

In the instant case, neither of these requirements were

There is nothing to indicate that appellant was in fact

listening to the officer's admonitions, let alone understanding
them.

Furthermore, there were no actions taken by appellant

evidencing any
test.

intent to refuse

to submit to the requested

Consequently, appellant's driver license should be or-

dered to be reinstated.
CONCLUSION
The evidence

here

is

insufficient

to

support

the

finding that the arresting officer described the consequences
of a refusal to take a chemical test in a fashion that would
clearly alert

the

driver

of

those

consequences.

Further,

appellant's actions did not constitute a clear indication of
her intent to refuse to take a chemical test.
Dated this

day of January, 1986.

G. FRED METOS

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies
were mailed/delivered

to the Attorney General's Office, 236

State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on this
day of January, 1986.

ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated
§41-6-44.10 (1953 as amended)
(1) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall be
deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of
his breath, bloodf or urine for the purpose of determining
whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited , or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
or combination of alcohol and any drug as detailed in section
41-6-44, so long as the test is or tests are administered at
the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that
person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
or combination of alcohol and any drug as detailed in section
41-6-44. A peace officer shall determine which of the aforesaid
tests shall be administered.
No person who has been requested under this section to submit
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine,
shall have the right to select the test or tests to be
administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to
arrange for any specific test is not a defense with regard to
taking a test requested by a peace officer and it shall not be
a defense in any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested
test or tests.
(2) If the person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more
of the chemical tests provided for in subsection (1) of this
section and refuses to submit to the chemical test or tests,
the person shall be warned by a peace officer requestinq the
test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can
result in revocation of his license to operate a motor vehicle.
Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests
the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be
administered, no test shall be given and a peace officer shall
submit a sworn report, within five days after the date of the
arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or
combination of alcohol and any drug as detailed in section
41-6-44 and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical
test or tests as set forth in subsection (1) of this section.
Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a peace

ADDENDUM CONTINUED
U.C.A. §41-6-44.10 (1953 as amended) continued
officer to the effect that the person has refused a chemical
test or tests the department shall notify the person of a
hearing before the department. If at that hearing the department
determines that the person was granted the right to submit to a
chemical test or tests as set forth in subsection (1) of this
section. Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a
peace officer to the effect that the person has refused a
chemical test or tests the department shall notify the person
of a hearing before the department. If at that hearing the
department determines that the person was granted the right to
submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the
test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the
department as required in the notice, the department shall
revoke for one year his license or permit to drive. The
department shall also assess against the person, in addition to
any fee imposed under subsection 41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which
must be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated,
to cover administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled
if the person obtains an unappealed court decision following a
proceeding allowed under this subsection that the revocation
was not proper. Any person whose license has been revoked by
the department under the provisions of this section shall have
the right to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a
hearing in the matter in the district court in the county in
which the person resides. The court is hereby vested with
jurisdiction, and it shall set the matter for trial do novo
upon 10-days1 written notice to the department and thereupon
take testimony and examine into the facts of the case and
determine whether the petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the provisions of this chapter.
Admonitions from the DUI Report Form
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your
blood shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content or
presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely
driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation of
your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must
warn you that if you refuse, your license or permit to drive a
motor vehicle can be revoked for one year with no provision for
a limited driver's license. After you have taken this test,
you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice
administer a test at your own expense in addition to the one I
have requested you to submit to, so long as it does not delay

ADDENDUM CONTINUED
Admonitions from the DUI Report Form continued
the test or tests requested by me. Upon your request, I will
make available to you the result of the test if you take it.
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel does not
apply to the implied consent law which is civil in nature and
separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent
does not give you the right to refuse to take the test. You do
not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure.
Unless you submit to the test I am reguestinq, I will consider
that you have refused to take the test. I warn you that if you
refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked
for one year with no provision for a limited license.

